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SECURITY INFORMATION

28 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEFS, [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : CIA Structural Organization in a Theater of War

1. The War Plans Division has asked for our help in preparing substantive data for negotiations with the JCS with respect to Opc missions and *raison d'etre* in a military theater of operations. Paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 provides that unconventional warfare shall be under the control and jurisdiction of the military theater commander. The question now has boiled down to what form this shall take. From the military side, a radical organizational chart proposes complete absorption of the Opc functions under actual military T/O's. The other school of thought believes that although under military control, the CIA structure and integrity should be preserved. Quite obviously, the paramilitary functions would come under complete military control, but it would appear that the specialized functions could be better performed and continued under the aegis of a CIA structure. Our purpose is to give CWP some reinforcing data to strengthen that latter point of view.

2. I have set forth below in very skeletonized form some thoughts that have occurred to me and would like your constructive contributions by noon, Monday, 2 June.

a. General:

(1) Opc's established cover mechanisms might be blown.

(2) Transference of responsibilities both from a staff and operating point of view always create confusion and dislocation. Under a wartime emergency situation this could be even compounded ~~and~~ the minimum transitional interference entailed in major reorganizational changes then come about.

(3)

(4)

b. Propaganda:

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b. Propaganda:

✓ (1) Military propaganda would be primarily tactical and targeted to military forces. As an operating entity under military staff control, a diversified covert and black propaganda mechanism could reach the target groups more effectively; i.e., peasants, professional class, international organizations, social groups, etc. *circled*

(2) *See memo attached*

(3)

(4)

c. Political Action:

✓ (1) By virtue of its contacts established in pre-war conditions, an integral CIA unit is better prepared to maintain those contacts and preserve the security of cut-outs.

✓ (2) There will be a natural antipathy of local political groupings to deal with or accommodate directly to military control. The psychological climate generated may be one of hostility rather than cooperation.

(3)

(4)

d. Economic Warfare:

✓ (1) Unfamiliarity of military personnel of direct dealing with local commercial and economic enterprises. The pre-established Opc activities in this field and the mechanisms created should be kept under CIA operating jurisdiction and cover.

✓ (2) Greater freedom of movement and contact would ensue for U. S. staff personnel and local agent personnel.

✓ (3) The operational responsibilities and techniques are of a specialized and peculiar nature which can best be executed under experienced representatives.

(4) Avoids encumbering

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✓  
(4) Avoids encumbering the military organizations with responsibility for operations of a strictly non-military nature.

(5)

(6)

Note: The above is only a rough to convey the idea. I would expect that with three or four people contributing we could work up a married concept.





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